There is much uncertainty about the sort of relationship that is claimed to between the general thesis of functionalism and physicalism. It has frequently been claimed that functionalism somehow "disproves" or falsifies physicalism tout court. On the other hand, the majority philosophers of mind who are functionalists claim to be physicalists indeed, some of them, such as David Lewis, have claimed to be strict reductionist-type physicalists. Functionalism is basically what Ned Block has called a broadly metaphysical thesis as opposed to a narrowly ontological one. That is, functionalism is not so much worried with what there is as with what it is that characterizes a certain type of mental state, e.g. pain, as the type of state that it is. Previous attempts to answer the mind-body problem have all tried to resolve it by answering both questions: dualism says there are two substances and that mental states are characterized by their immateriality; behaviorism claimed that there was one substance and that mental states were behavioral disposition; physicalism asserted the existence of just one substance and characterized the mental states as physical states.
On this considerate, type physicalism can be seen as incompatible with functionalism, since it claims that what characterizes mental states is that they are physical in nature, while functionalism says that what describe pain are its functional/causal role and its relationship with yelling "ouch", etc. but, any weaker sort of physicalism which makes the simple ontological claim that everything that exists is made up of inorganic matter is perfectly compatible with functionalism. Moreover, most functionalists who are physicalists require that the properties that are quantified over in functional definitions be physical properties. Hence, they are physicalists, even though the common thesis of functionalism itself does not commit them to being so. In the case of David Lewis, there is a distinction in the concepts of "having pain" (a rigid designator true in all possible worlds) and just "pain" (a non-rigid designator). Pain, for Lewis, stands for something like the definite description "the state with the causal role x". The referent of the description in humans is a type of brain state to be determined by science. The referent among silicon-based life forms is something else. The referent of the description among angels is some immaterial, non-physical state. For Lewis, therefore, local type-physical reductions are possible and compatible with conceptual functionalism. There seems to be some uncertainty between types and tokens that needs to be cleared up in the functionalist analysis.
On this considerate, type physicalism can be seen as incompatible with functionalism, since it claims that what characterizes mental states is that they are physical in nature, while functionalism says that what describe pain are its functional/causal role and its relationship with yelling "ouch", etc. but, any weaker sort of physicalism which makes the simple ontological claim that everything that exists is made up of inorganic matter is perfectly compatible with functionalism. Moreover, most functionalists who are physicalists require that the properties that are quantified over in functional definitions be physical properties. Hence, they are physicalists, even though the common thesis of functionalism itself does not commit them to being so. In the case of David Lewis, there is a distinction in the concepts of "having pain" (a rigid designator true in all possible worlds) and just "pain" (a non-rigid designator). Pain, for Lewis, stands for something like the definite description "the state with the causal role x". The referent of the description in humans is a type of brain state to be determined by science. The referent among silicon-based life forms is something else. The referent of the description among angels is some immaterial, non-physical state. For Lewis, therefore, local type-physical reductions are possible and compatible with conceptual functionalism. There seems to be some uncertainty between types and tokens that needs to be cleared up in the functionalist analysis.
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